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Abstract: We conduct and analyze two large surveys of hypothetical annuitization 
choices. We find that allowing individuals to annuitize a fraction of their wealth increases 
annuitization relative to a situation where annuitization is an “all or nothing” decision. 
Very few respondents choose declining real payout streams over flat or increasing real 
payout streams of equivalent expected present value. Highlighting the effects of inflation 
increases demand for cost of living adjustments. Frames that highlight flexibility, control, 
and investment significantly reduce annuitization. A majority of respondents prefer to 
receive an extra “bonus” payment during one month of the year that is funded by slightly 
lower payments in the remaining months. Concerns about later-life income, spending 
flexibility, and counterparty risk are the most important self-reported motives that 
influence the annuitization decision. 
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I. Introduction  
Many households resist annuitization. In U.S. defined benefit (DB) pension plans that 
offer a lump-sum option, between 50% and 75% of eligible DB benefits are taken as a lump sum, 
even though the annuity is the default option and opting out requires time-consuming paperwork 
(Mottola and Utkus, 2007; Benartzi, Previtero, and Thaler, 2011; Previtero, 2012; Banerjee 
2013). In defined contribution (DC) savings plans, only 10% of participants who leave their job 
after age 65 annuitize their assets (Johnson, Burman, and Kobes, 2004). This resistance to 
annuitization is referred to as the “annuitization puzzle” (Modigliani, 1986), since the benefit of 
buying insurance against outliving one’s savings should create strong demand for annuities 
(Yaari, 1965; Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond, 2005).  
Researchers have explored a variety of rational motives that could explain the low 
demand for annuities, such as adverse selection (Mitchell et al., 1999; Finkelstein and Poterba, 
2004), bequest motives (Friedman and Warshawsky, 1990; Brown, 2001; Inkmann, Lopes, and 
Michaelides, 2011; Ameriks et al., 2011; Lockwood, 2012), uncertain healthcare expenses (Pang 
and Warshawsky, 2010; Ameriks et al., 2011; Poterba, Venti, and Wise, 2011), annuity prices 
(Warner and Pleeter, 2001; Fitzpatrick, 2012), means-tested government benefits (Pashchenko, 
2010; Bütler, Peijnenburg, and Staubli, 2011), and the annuity embedded in Social Security and 
defined-benefit pension plans (Bernheim, 1991; Dushi and Webb, 2004; Beshears, Choi, 
Laibson, and Madrian, 2011).  
In this paper, we take no stand on how much of the annuitization puzzle remains after 
accounting for these rational motives. We instead focus on the elasticity of annuity demand with 
respect to annuity product design and choice architecture.
1 To study these issues, we fielded two 
large surveys in which we elicited hypothetical annuitization choices from individuals aged 50 to 
75. We examine 1) what factors people say are important to their annuitization choices, 2) how 
offering “partial annuitization,” rather than an all-or-nothing choice, influences outcomes, 3) 
individual preferences over the intertemporal slope of annuity payouts, 4) whether altering the 
                                                 
1 Other authors have also studied the role of behavioral factors in annuity choice such as recent stock market returns 
(Chalmers and Reuter, 2012; Previtero, 2012) and framing (Brown, 2008; Brown et al., 2008; Agnew et al., 2008; 
Brown, Kapteyn, and Mitchell, 2012). 2 
 
framing
2 used to describe options influences annuitization choices, and 5) whether there is 
demand for an annuity product that makes an extra “bonus” payment during one month of the 
year that is funded by slightly lower payments in the remaining months.  
The use of surveys such as these has advantages and disadvantages. On the positive side, 
we can ask questions that directly measure specific preferences, including preferences for 
products not available on the market. We can also examine choices in economic environments 
that differ from the current one. On the negative side, the choices people make do not influence 
their actual life outcomes, so the results may not correspond to the choices people would make in 
real-life settings. Surveys like ours provide a starting point for designing field experiments with 
larger stakes.
3 
Five findings emerge from our surveys. First, there are three considerations that 
respondents report being most important for their decision about whether or not to annuitize: a 
desire to “make sure I have enough income later in life,” a desire for “flexibility in the timing of 
my spending,” and being “worried about [the] company not being able to pay me in the future.” 
Current regulations ban insurance companies from mentioning back-stop state funds in their 
marketing of annuity products. While such bans may reduce moral hazard problems by 
encouraging consumers to be selective, they may also have the perverse effect of decreasing 
annuity demand. We provide new evidence that this latter effect is important. 
Second, we find that a substantial fraction of people choose partial annuitization when it 
is offered, and that offering partial annuitization rather than an “all-or-nothing” annuitization 
choice increases both the percentage of people choosing any annuitization and the average 
percentage of pension balances that are annuitized. Many DB pension plans offer individuals the 
choice between taking a lump sum and an annuity.
4 The U.S. Treasury Department recently 
                                                 
2 We abuse the “framing” terminology slightly by using it to describe some treatments that not only present the 
choice in a different way, but also provide additional information. 
3 Arguably, survey responses from those who are more likely to be in a position to purchase annuities would 
correspond more closely to real-life choices. All of our results on framing treatment effects and demand for 
alternative annuity products are similar when restricting the sample to those who have net worth above the sample 
median. 
4 A 2011 Aon Hewitt survey of 227 DB plan sponsors found that over 40% offered a lump sum option, and over 
20% more responded that they were “very likely to implement” or “somewhat likely to implement” a lump sum 
payment option in the future (Aon Hewitt, 2011). It is thought that many employees perceive the annuitization 
versus lump sum choice as being an “all-or-nothing” choice (http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Documents/020212%20Retirement%20Security%20Factsheet.pdf). 3 
 
proposed a new regulation to make it easier for DB plans to offer a combination of an annuity 
and a lump sum (Federal Register, 2012). Our findings suggest this proposal will increase 
annuitization in plans that already offer a lump sum withdrawal option. 
Third, we find that holding the present value of expected payments fixed, very few 
respondents choose declining real income paths. Our respondents prefer flat or rising real income 
paths. This result underscores how puzzling the dearth of inflation-indexed annuities in the 
marketplace is. This result also contrasts with the empirical fact that holding household 
composition fixed, real consumption declines by about 2% per year during retirement (Hurd and 
Rohwedder, 2011). We also find that making salient the effects of inflation on real payout values 
increases the demand for cost of living adjustments (COLAs). 
Fourth, we find that two framing changes significantly reduce demand for annuitization 
relative to a neutral frame: one that focuses on flexibility and control, and a second that focuses 
on investment attributes. Four other framing changes do not have a significant effect on 
annuitization: explaining that the annuity being offered is a better deal than what could be 
purchased on the open market, presenting the total expected undiscounted lifetime payments 
from the annuity, explaining that the annuity provides insurance against outliving one’s savings, 
and explaining that the annuity transfers money from states where one is dead and the value of 
money is low to states where one is alive and the value of money is high.  
Finally, we find that 60% of our subjects prefer a product that pays an annual bonus in a 
month of their choosing over a product with a traditional uniform monthly payout. Annual 
bonuses expand annuitants’ control over their high-frequency payout streams without 
jeopardizing the low-frequency withdrawal restrictions that make longevity insurance possible. 
The preference for such a product is consistent with subjects’ responses that wanting “flexibility 
in the timing of my spending” is an important factor in their annuitization decision. Allowing 
more customization of payout streams may increase annuity demand. Other customization 
schemes are easy to imagine, such as multiple intra-year bonuses or age-contingent payout 
patterns. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we describe our two 
surveys. In Section III, we present summary statistics on our sample, and in Section IV, we 
present our empirical results. Section V concludes by discussing the implications of our findings 
for the design of pensions and annuity products.  4 
 
 
II. Survey design  
We designed two surveys and retained the online survey firm Toluna to administer them 
to 1,000 (Survey 1) and 4,130 (Survey 2) U.S. residents ages 50-75 in August 2011 and June 
2012, respectively.
5 U.S. macroeconomic conditions were similar in both periods, characterized 
by a tepid recovery from a deep recession. The seasonally adjusted trailing one-year GDP growth 
rate was 1.6% in the third quarter of 2011 and 2.1% in the second quarter of 2012.  The 
unemployment rate was 9.0 % in August 2011 and 8.2% in June 2012. The trailing one-year 
S&P 500 total return was higher at the beginning of August 2011 than at the beginning of June 
2012 (19.7% versus -0.4%).
6 The median times taken to complete the surveys were 13 minutes 
(Survey 1) and 8 minutes (Survey 2). Participants in both surveys made hypothetical choices 
about pension income in retirement. They then ranked the importance of different reasons for 
their choices and answered a set of demographic questions during the same online session. The 
full surveys are available in an online appendix. 
 
A. Survey 1 
Survey 1 asked participants to make choices under the following hypothetical scenario: 
“Just before you retire at age 65, you are working for a company that will give you pension 
payments every month for the rest of your life after you retire. This income is guaranteed, but the 
payments will stop when you die. You will also receive Social Security benefits every month for 
the rest of your life after you retire.” Note that this scenario is like that of a traditional DB 
pension plan.  
Because one of the main issues we wished to explore in this survey was preferences over 
real annuity payment growth rates, we told respondents to assume that inflation would be 2% for 
the rest of their lives. We described inflation as follows: “With inflation, prices rise, so you get 
less for your money than you used to. For example, suppose a basket of groceries costs you $100 
today. A year later, the same groceries will cost you $102. The price of the groceries has gone up 
                                                 
5 Participants were part of a large panel maintained by Toluna who are paid for their participation in each survey. 
We ran two separate surveys because our research program evolved over time. 
6 Based on the evidence of Previtero (2012), it is possible our respondents’ baseline desire to annuitize was lower in 
Survey 1 than in Survey 2 because of the higher prior stock market return in August 2011. 5 
 
because there has been inflation.” They were also told that “the interest rate will be 5% for the 
rest of your life.”  
Participants made choices about the intertemporal slope of their annuity payouts, whether 
to receive intra-year “bonus” payments, and how much of their pension stream to cash out and 
receive as a lump sum. In each case, the present value of the options’ expected payouts was 
$330,000, based on the stated interest rate and Social Security mortality tables (averaging male 
and female mortalities together).
7 In calculating annuity payouts, we included no fees or markups 
for costs. In order to avoid having responses be influenced by any negative association 




Slope of annuity payouts 
In the first question, participants were told: “Suppose the company lets you choose 
between the following two retirement income options. The total cost to the company of 
providing these lifetime payments to you is expected to be the same under either option.” The 
two options were the following: 
A) Match-Inflation Income: “Your first year of monthly payments will sum to $24,200. 
Your monthly payments will rise by 2% each year for the rest of your life. The increase 
in your payments will match the increase in prices (inflation).” 
B) Steady Income: “Your first year of monthly payments will sum to $29,000. Your 
monthly payments will stay the same for the rest of your life. Because inflation is 2% 
each year, the amount you can buy with your income will fall by 2% each year.” 
Below these descriptions and before participants were asked to make their choice, 
subjects were shown three graphs. The first (see Figure 1) was a graph depicting the likelihood 
that a person aged 65 today will live to at least age 70, 75, 80, 85, 90, 95, and 100. The graph’s 
mortality probabilities were the average of male and female mortalities. The second was a graph 
                                                 
7 The mortality data came from “Life Tables for the United States Social Security Area 1900-2100,” Actuarial Study 
No. 120, which can be found at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/NOTES/as120/TOC.html. 
8 The cost of not using the terms “annuity” and “annuitization” is the risk that participants who were familiar with 
the terms could have become confused about whether our failure to use them implied that the product being offered 
was something different from an annuity. 6 
 
showing how much something that costs $1 today would cost in the future, from ages 65 to 100 
(see Figure 2). The third graph (see Figure 3) showed the yearly nominal amount received under 
each option from ages 65 to 100. 
Participants were then asked to make another choice between two options: 
A) Match-Inflation Income, as described in the previous question 
B) High-Growth Income: “Your first year of monthly payments will sum to $19,900. 
Your monthly payments will grow by 4% every year. The increase in these payments will 
be larger than the increase in prices (inflation).” 
Between the description of the options and where participants were to indicate their choice, we 
showed a graph depicting the yearly nominal amount received under each option from age 65 to 
100, and we provided hyperlinks to the previously shown graphs of mortality probabilities and 
inflation in case participants wished to review them. 
 
Bonus payments 
Participants were asked two questions about the addition of bonus payments to their 
income options. The first question asked participants to choose between the following two 
options: 
A) Match-Inflation Income: “In the first year, you will receive $2,000 every month. This 
monthly payment will grow by 2% every year for the rest of your life, matching the 
increase in prices.” 
B)  Match-Inflation Income with Bonuses: “In the first year, you will receive $1,900 in 
every month except for one, when you will get $1,900 plus an extra $1,200. You can 
choose in which month the $1,200 bonus is paid. This month might be a time when 
you often want to spend extra. For example, you might like to travel somewhere 
warm or spend extra money during the December holiday season. The regular 
monthly payments and the bonus will each grow by 2% every year for the rest of 
your life.” 7 
 
Participants were told, “The total cost to the company of providing these lifetime payments to 
you is expected to be the same under either option.” Participants who chose Match-Inflation 
Income with Bonuses were asked to choose in which month they would like the bonus to be paid. 
Participants were then asked to choose between the Match-Inflation Income plan and an 
income stream with an annual bonus that declined at the end of each decade of life. Again, both 
payment paths had the same expected present value. We wished to see whether a declining 
intertemporal payout slope would be more appealing if the decline were justified as a declining 
travel bonus. The description of the declining bonus was as follows:  
B)  Match-Inflation Income with Travel Bonuses: “You will receive $1,800 every month 
in the first year. These monthly payments will grow 2% each year for the rest of 
your life. From age 65 to 69, you will receive an extra $3,000 every June to use for 
traveling (or whatever else you want). During your 70s, you will receive an extra 
$2,000 every June. During your 80s, you will receive an extra $1,000 every June. 
Because you probably won’t be doing much traveling in your 90s, there is no travel 
bonus after age 89.” 
 
Lifetime income stream versus a lump sum 
We included three questions asking participants to choose what percent of their annuity 
benefit to cash out as a lump sum. The first question asked participants about the Match-Inflation 
income stream, offering three cash-out options: A) “0% Cash Out,” which gave participants 
monthly payments that summed to $24,200 in the first year and increased 2% annually, but no 
lump sum payout, B) “50% Cash Out,” which gave participants $165,000 immediately plus 
monthly payments that summed to $12,100 in the first year and increased 2% annually, and C) 
“100% Cash Out,” which gave participants $330,000 immediately and no other payment for the 
rest of their lives. Participants were told the three options had the same expected costs to the 
company. Participants were shown a graph (see Figure 4) of the nominal annual payouts they 
would receive (excluding any lump-sum payment) under each option, from ages 65 to 100.  
The second and third questions asked about cash-out rates for the Steady Income and 
High-Growth Income annuities described above, letting participants choose in each case among 
“0% Cash Out,” “50% Cash Out,” and “100% Cash Out” options after seeing a graph of the 8 
 
nominal yearly payout amounts (excluding any lump sum) they would receive from ages 65 to 
100 under each option.  
 
Exit questions 
After answering all of the annuity choice questions, participants were asked to rate on a 
six-point Likert scale (0 for not important, 5 for very important) the importance of eleven 
potential reasons for their cash-out choices. Participants were also asked about their life 
expectancy relative to the average person of their age and a set of demographic questions. The 
survey concluded with two questions related to the clarity of the survey. The first asked whether 
respondents thought the questions were clear or confusing on a scale between 0 (completely 
clear) and 5 (completely confusing). The second question had an open-response box for 
respondents to explain what, if anything, they found unclear or confusing. Eighty-seven percent 
of Survey 1 participants reported that the survey was “clear” or “mostly clear,” whereas less than 
1% reported the survey to be “mostly confusing” or “completely confusing” (see Table 1).  
 
B. Survey 2 
In Survey 2, participants were also asked to make annuitization choices based on a 
hypothetical retirement scenario. This scenario, which is different than the one presented in 
Survey 1, was described in the first page of the survey:  
“Suppose that you are 65 years old. You are about to retire and have accumulated 
$500,000 in the pension plan at your current employer. Your employer wants to know 
whether you prefer to receive this balance as a lump sum payment right now (in other 
words, a single $500,000 payment) or as a stream of fixed payments over your lifetime, 
which your employer calls the guaranteed lifetime income option. This stream of fixed 
payments is based on current market interest rates. The fixed payments won’t change in 
the future even if market interest rates do change.” 
This wording describes the pension benefit as a dollar accumulation rather than as an accrued 
income stream. Thus, Survey 2 puts the respondent in a setting more like that of a cash balance 
or DC pension plan, rather than the traditional DB setting of Survey 1. We also put respondents 
in their current macroeconomic environment, with all its uncertainties, instead of fixing the 
future inflation and interest rates as in Survey 1. We made this choice because we wished to 9 
 
study the demand for COLAs, and a significant benefit of a COLA is the hedge it provides 
against inflation risk. 
In Survey 1, we provided only single life annuities, regardless of marital status. In Survey 
2, we offered single life annuities to unmarried respondents, and joint and 100% survivor 
annuities to married respondents. As in Survey 1, nowhere in Survey 2 was the word “annuity” 
or “annuitization” used. The annuity option was described throughout the survey as a 
“guaranteed lifetime income option.” 
We based Survey 2’s annuity payouts on actual price quotes from Western National Life 
Insurance as of March 1, 2012 for a $500,000 annuity.
9 For participants who were single, we 
averaged the monthly payout for the male single life annuity ($2,790.74) and the female single 
life annuity ($2,627.87) and multiplied the average by 110%. For participants who were married, 
we multiplied the joint and 100% survivor annuity monthly payout of $2,378.20 by 110%. We 
multiplied the monthly payouts by 110% to account for the likelihood that an annuity purchased 
through an employer charges lower fees and to ensure that the annuity we were offering would 
be more generous than anything available on the open market—a feature necessary for the Good 
Deal treatment described below. The final monthly payout offered for somebody annuitizing 
100% of his or her balances was $2,981 per month for single survey participants and $2,616 for 
married participants.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight different treatment arms
10:  
•  Minimal Framing baseline: Participants could choose to take 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, or 
100% of their $500,000 balance as a lump sum. They indicated their annuitization choice 
by clicking one of five buttons that were ordered from 0% cash-out on the far left to 
100% cash-out on the far right. A horizontal axis with an arrow on each end was shown 
above the buttons. The left end of the axis was labeled “Lower lump sum/More 
guaranteed income” and the right end of the axis was labeled “Higher lump sum/Less 
guaranteed income.” (See Figure 5.) The remaining treatments were identical to the 
Minimal Framing baseline except in the ways described below. 
                                                 
9 At that time, this was the most competitive quote on the Hueler Income Solutions website, incomesolutions.com. 
10 One treatment we did not implement is making salient to respondents that Social Security provides a real annuity. 
We suspect that such a treatment would have reduced annuity demand, although we have no empirical evidence on 
this matter. 10 
 
•  All or Nothing treatment: Participants were only allowed to choose to annuitize their 
entire $500,000 balance or receive a $500,000 lump-sum payment. This treatment 
showed no horizontal axis. 
•  Good Deal treatment: This treatment was designed to overcome any reluctance to 
annuitize due to the fear of foregoing a better deal elsewhere. The following text was 
added to the description of the annuity: “The guaranteed lifetime income option gives 
you higher payments than you would get by buying an identical product from an 
insurance company because your employer will not charge you fees.” 
•  Total Payments treatment: The motivation for this treatment was the hypothesis that the 
reluctance to annuitize may partly be due to the contrast between the large size of the 
lump sum and the small size of the monthly annuity payment. If this is the case, 
highlighting the undiscounted expected total payments from complete annuitization, 
which are larger than the $500,000 lump sum amount, may increase annuitization. We 
added the text, “The average individual who chooses 100% guaranteed income will 
receive total lifetime payments of $x.” The number x was the expected undiscounted total 
lifetime payments of a 100% annuitization choice, which was $695,765 for single 
participants and $775,382 for married participants.
11  
•  Investment Framing treatment: Brown et al. (2008) find that an investment frame 
discourages annuitization relative to a consumption frame. In this treatment, we included 
a discussion of how the rate of return would vary with longevity: “Under the guaranteed 
income option, you get a higher return on your $500,000 investment if you die old and a 
lower return if you die young. Under the lump sum, you get the same return whether you 
die young or old.” We relabeled the axis to show “Higher return if you die old/Lower 
return if you die young” on the left side, and “Same return whether you die young or 
old,” on the right side. This frames the annuity as risky, rather than emphasizing its role 
in providing insurance.  
                                                 
11 We used the average of male and female mortality rates to calculate this expectation for singles, and assumed that 
married spouses were both 65 years old.  11 
 
•  Flexibility and Control treatment: Annuities may be unattractive because they require 
giving up control of one’s investments and the timing of one’s spending. We added the 
following language about flexibility and control: “Choosing a bigger lump sum gives you 
more control over your investments and more flexibility over the timing of your 
spending.” We changed the axis labels to “You have less control and less flexibility” on 
the left side and “You have more control and more flexibility” on the right side.  
•  Longevity Insurance treatment: The Investment Framing treatment framed annuities as a 
risky choice. The Longevity Insurance treatment framed annuities as a risk-reducing 
choice. We added the following text: “Choosing more guaranteed income gives you more 
assurance that you will not outlive your savings, since the monthly payments will 
continue as long as you live.” We changed the axis labels to “Less risk of outliving your 
savings” on the left side and “Greater risk of outliving your savings” on the right side.  
•  Mortality Credits treatment: Reluctance to annuitize may be driven by a failure to realize 
that annuities have the attractive property of transferring money from low marginal utility 
states to high marginal utility states. We added the following language to explain this: 
“The monthly payment from the guaranteed lifetime income option is much higher than 
the interest you would receive from investing the lump sum. The guaranteed income 
option stops payments when you are no longer alive. In return, the guaranteed income 
option delivers very high pay-outs as long as you live. You are giving up payments when 
you are no longer alive (and don’t need the money) and receiving extra-large payments as 
long as you are alive (and need the money).” 
After making an annuitization choice, participants were shown a graph of the likelihood 
that a person aged 65 today would live to at least age 70, 75, 80, 85, 90, 95, and 100. They were 
asked to again elect how to receive their pension payment, with the qualification that it was fine 
to give the same answer as the previous question. The purpose of this second elicitation was to 
see whether unrealistic longevity expectations were affecting the annuitization choice. 
Participants in every treatment arm were then asked about a cost-of-living-adjustment 
provision. We presented the following scenario: “Now suppose that your employer only offers a 
guaranteed lifetime income option. But you can choose whether you want a cost-of-living 12 
 
adjustment (COLA) to your payments.” Each participant was randomly assigned (independent of 
their assignment to the previous treatments) to one of three versions of the COLA question: 
•  Minimal Inflation Information baseline: Unmarried participants were told, “If you don’t 
choose a cost-of-living adjustment, then your monthly pension payment will be $2,981 a 
month for the rest of your life. If you do choose a cost-of-living adjustment, then your 
first monthly pension payment will be $2,033 a month, but this amount will increase over 
time at a rate equal to the inflation rate (as measured by the Consumer Price Index).” 
Married participants had the two dollar figures replaced with $2,616 and $1,784. 
Participants were then asked whether they preferred a COLA over no COLA.  
•  Inflation Compounding treatment: Some people may not fully understand what inflation 
is. In addition, many people underestimate how quickly exponential series grow 
(Eisenstein and Hoch, 2005). Therefore, they may be unaware how much low levels of 
annual inflation will erode the purchasing power of a dollar over long horizons. In this 
treatment, we added to the Minimal Inflation Information baseline text a slightly fuller 
explanation of inflation and a calculation illustrating the long-run power of inflation. The 
following text was appended to the description of the no-COLA option for unmarried 
participants: “This means that as the cost of living increases, $2,981 per month will buy 
fewer goods and services. For example, if the cost of living increases by 2% per year for 
the rest of your life and you don’t have a cost-of-living adjustment, your monthly pension 
payment will buy 33% fewer goods and services at age 85 than it does at age 65.” The 
text for married participants was analogous. The COLA option description had the 
following additional sentence: “So your monthly payment will buy about the same 
amount of goods and services at every age in the future as it does at age 65.”  
•  Inflation Compounding With Graph treatment: This treatment was identical to the 
Inflation Compounding treatment, except we also included a graph of what nominal 
payments would be from age 65 to 100 for the annuity with and without the COLA. 
We set the initial monthly payment amount for the annuity with a COLA in the above 
questions to be 68.2% of the non-COLA annuity’s monthly payment. We computed this ratio 
using June 6, 2012 quotes from the Principal Life Insurance Company for a $500,000 joint and 13 
 
100% survivor annuity with and without an inflation adjustment based on changes in the 
Consumer Price Index for All-Urban Consumers (CPI-U).
12  
After answering the annuity choice questions, Survey 2 participants were asked to rate 
the importance on a six-point Likert scale (0 for not important, 5 for very important) of ten 
reasons for their lump sum versus annuity choices. These reasons mostly overlapped with those 
in Survey 1. Participants were also asked questions about their life expectancy, demographics, 
and the clarity of the survey that were identical to the Survey 1 questions. As with Survey 1, the 
vast majority (93%) of Survey 2 participants reported that the questions were understandable and 
clear, and less than 1% found the survey to be “mostly confusing” or “completely confusing” 
(Table 1).  
 
III. Summary statistics 
Table 2 presents summary statistics on participant demographics and relative life 
expectancy in Surveys 1 and 2. The two survey populations are very similar.
13 The mean age is 
59.5 years for Survey 1 and 59.6 years for Survey 2. In both surveys, 50% of participants are 
male, 55% are married, and the average number of children is 2. Somewhat more Survey 2 
respondents are retired than Survey 1 respondents: 40% versus 36%. Almost 40% of participants 
have a DB pension, and about 70% own a home. The median net worth for participants, which 
we measure with considerable noise and for only about three-quarters of our sample, is $162,500 
in Survey 1 and $150,000 in Survey 2, and the respective means are $298,217 and $286,594.
14 
College graduates comprise about 40% of both samples, and 12 to 13% of the sample have a 
post-graduate degree. 
                                                 
12 The annuity monthly payouts (obtained via the Hueler Income Solutions web site) were $2,232.42 per month with 
no COLA and $1,524.44 per month with a COLA, giving a ratio of 68.2%. The CPI-U rider had no cap on the 
increase, and the monthly payment would be adjusted annually on the contract anniversary date. If the CPI-U were 
negative, the periodic benefit would not decrease. Future years’ monthly payments would not increase until CPI-U 
exceeded its previous high.  
13 There is no overlap in the individuals included in Survey 1 and Survey 2. 
14 Out of the 1,000 participants in Survey 1 and 4,130 participants in Survey 2, there were 752 and 3,169, 
respectively, who responded to all of the questions necessary to calculate net worth. The surveys had participants 
give interval responses for the components of net worth. To calculate total net worth, we map each interval to its 
midpoint except in the case of intervals without an upper bound, which we map to a value equal to 150% of the 
lower bound of the upper interval. 14 
 
We asked respondents how much longer they expected to live relative to others their age. 
In Survey 1, 36% of participants said they expected to live longer than the average person their 
age, 54% said they expected to live about the same amount of time as the average person their 
age, and 10% said they expected to die sooner than the average person their age. Responses to 
Survey 2 were similar: 34% of participants anticipated a relatively long life, 54% anticipated a 
life about as long as that of an average person of the same age, and 12% anticipated a relatively 
short life. The greater number of people anticipating a relatively long life is not necessarily 
evidence of optimistic bias, since our sample is more educated than the typical American in this 
age bracket, and longevity is positively correlated with education (Meara, Richard, and Cutler, 
2008). The U.S. Census reports that among all 45 to 64 year olds in the U.S. in 2007, only 29% 
were college graduates. 
Consistent with the importance of adverse selection in annuity markets, the average 
percent of balances annuitized was significantly lower for respondents with lower self-reported 
life expectancy. Averaging the five lump sum versus annuity decisions in the two surveys, those 
who expected to die sooner annuitized 47% of their balances, those who expected to live about 
the average length annuitized 56%, and those who expected to live longer than average 
annuitized 57% (not shown in tables). The difference between the lowest life expectancy group 
and the others is significant at the 1% level. 
 
IV. Results  
We present six sets of findings: 1) demographic correlates of annuitization, 2) obstacles 
to and motivations for annuitization, 3) the effect of offering partial annuitization, 4) the desired 
intertemporal slope of retirement income and the demand for COLAs, 5) framing effects, and 6) 
the demand for “bonuses” (uneven intra-year payments).  
 
A. Demographic correlates of annuitization 
Table 3 shows the results of regressing the fraction of balances annuitized in each of the 
five annuity versus lump sum decisions in our surveys on age, number of children, and dummies 
for being male, a college graduate, married, retired, and a homeowner. In Survey 1, the three 
decisions involved tradeoffs between the lump sum and the Steady Income, Match-Inflation, or 
High-Growth annuity. In Survey 2, the two decisions involved tradeoffs between the flat nominal 15 
 
annuity and the lump sum before seeing the mortality graph and after seeing the mortality graph. 
We pool all of the treatment arms in each Survey 2 regression. 
We find that collectively, the demographic variables explain very little of the variation in 
annuitization choices (the R
2s are all very low); in addition, very few of the demographic 
variables are significantly correlated with annuity demand. In Survey 1, being a homeowner is 
associated with a 5.8 percentage point lower fraction of balances invested in the Steady Income 
annuity. In Survey 2, being married is associated with a 3.9 percentage point higher fraction of 
balances invested in the flat nominal annuity before seeing the mortality graph. After seeing the 
mortality graph, being retired is associated with a 3.0 percentage point higher fraction of 
balances annuitized, and each child is associated with a 0.7 percentage point lower fraction of 
balances annuitized. In untabulated results, we additionally control for net worth, which reduces 
our sample sizes because of non-response. Net worth is negatively correlated with the fraction 
invested in the Steady Income annuity in Survey 1. This additional control also causes the 
homeowner dummy to lose significance in the Steady Income regression and the number of 
children variable to lose significance in the Survey 2 regression of annuitization percentage after 
seeing the mortality chart. 
It is difficult to compare these results to others in the literature on the demographic 
correlates of annuitization because the hypothetical situations in which our respondents made 
their decisions differ from the real or hypothetical situations in which individuals in other studies 
made their annuitization decisions. In addition, other studies control for a different set of 
covariates than we do, so the coefficient on a given variable has a different interpretation in our 
analysis than in others. Brown (2001) finds that among older U.S. adults in the Health and 
Retirement Survey, self-reported intentions to annuitize DC plan assets in the future are higher 
for single individuals and those with less wealth, but do not vary with current age, gender, 
education, and the presence of children when a model-estimated value of annuitizing is 
controlled for. Mottola and Utkus (2007) examine actual annuitization choices at two large U.S. 
firms and report that lower wealth, female gender, and being unmarried are associated with more 
annuitization.
15 
                                                 
15 For evidence on demographic correlates of annuity demand outside the U.S., see Bütler and Teppa (2007) and 
Inkmann, Lopes, and Michaelides (2011). 16 
 
 
B. Obstacles to and motivations for annuitization  
In Figure 6, we present the average importance individuals reported placing on various 
factors when making their lump sum versus annuitization choices. Ratings are similar across the 
two surveys on factors whose importance rating was elicited on both surveys. The factor with the 
highest average importance is the desire to “make sure I have enough income later in life,” with 
an average rating of 3.9 to 4.0 out of 5. The next highest category is “flexibility in the timing of 
my spending,” with an average rating of 3.5 in both surveys, closely followed by “worried about 
company not being able to pay me,” with an average rating of 3.4 in both surveys. The desire for 
flexibility manifests itself in the 3.2 rating placed on “I might have a big spending need 
sometime during retirement” (asked only on Survey 2). The low rating of 1.6 on “I have a big 
spending need right after retirement” (asked only on Survey 1) suggests that respondents do not 
have a specific spending need in mind. 
Worries about inflation (average rating of 3.0 to 3.3), the desire to invest the money on 
one’s own (average rating of 3.0 to 3.1), and the desire to prevent overspending (average rating 
of 2.7 to 3.0) are intermediate-level concerns. In contrast, two other motives that are commonly 
discussed in the annuities literature are reported to have little absolute importance by our survey 
participants. The desire to give money to children or others garners an average rating of 2.1 to 
2.4, and worries about dying early receive an average rating of 2.3. The factor rated least 
important is the desire to keep money away from children or others, which has an average rating 
of 1.4. In Survey 1, the annuity offered did not have a survivor benefit, and the fact that lifetime 
payments would not provide for one’s spouse after one’s death has a 3.5 importance rating 
among married participants in this survey. 
How do these factor ratings correlate with annuitization choices? Table 4 shows results 
from regressing the percent of balances subjects choose to annuitize in Survey 2 before seeing 
the mortality chart on the subjects’ factor ratings, pooling together all the treatment arms.
16 All 
of the factor ratings except “want to keep money from children or others” (which had the lowest 
absolute importance rating in Survey 2) and “I might have a big spending need sometime during 
                                                 
16 The regression results from using Survey 1 annuity choices are broadly similar. Additionally controlling for 
Survey 2 treatment dummies and demographic characteristics does not qualitatively alter the coefficients on the 
factor importance ratings. 17 
 
retirement” are significantly correlated with the fraction of balances annuitized. Annuitization is 
increasing in the importance placed on having enough income later in life, worries about 
inflation, and the desire to prevent overspending, while it is decreasing in the importance placed 
on flexibility in the timing of spending, worries about counterparty risk, the desire to invest 
money on one’s own, the desire to give money to one’s children or others, and worries about 
dying early. The insignificance of “I might have a big spending need sometime during 
retirement” is initially puzzling given that factor’s high absolute importance rating, but the 
factor’s coefficient becomes negative and significant if the “Want flexibility in the timing of my 
spending” rating is excluded from the regression, indicating that the former rating captures a 
strict subset of the motives measured by the latter rating. 
From the perspective of product design, it is not obvious whether the levels (Figure 6) or 
the sensitivities (Table 4) are the most relevant statistics. In Appendix 2, we sketch a model that 
analyzes this issue (without resolving it one way or the other).  
 
C. Partial annuitization  
Mark Iwry, senior adviser to the Secretary of the Treasury and deputy assistant secretary 
for retirement and health policy, has stated that the U.S. Treasury Department would like to see 
DB plans move away from offering an “all-or-nothing” choice between an annuity and a lump 
sum to offering a variety of choices combining annuity and lump-sum payouts (Steverman, 
2012). To assess the effect of such a change, we compare annuitization choices under two 
treatments in Survey 2: i) the All or Nothing treatment, in which the only options were 0% 
Annuitization and 100% annuitization, and ii) the Minimal Framing baseline which contained 
five annuitization options (from 0% to 100% in increments of 25%).  
Figure 7 shows the distribution of annuitization percentages chosen under each condition 
prior to seeing the mortality chart. We find that a majority of individuals (59%) choose partial 
annuitization when given the opportunity to do so. These partial annuitants represent shifts from 
both the full annuitization and full lump-sum outcomes under the All or Nothing treatment. The 
fraction of individuals who fully annuitize falls from 50% to 21%, and the fraction of individuals 
who choose a full lump sum similarly falls from 50% to 20%. Correspondingly, allowing for 
partial annuitization increases the fraction of people choosing a positive amount of annuitization 
from 50% to 80%. Finally, allowing partial annuitization raises the average percent of pension 18 
 
wealth annuitized from 50% to 57%. These last two differences are significant at the 1% level 
and do not qualitatively change if we additionally control for age, gender, having a college 
degree, marital status, retirement status, number of children, and home ownership (regression 
results in Online Appendix Table A2). Our findings suggest that expanding the use of partial 




D. Slopes of annuity payments and COLAs 
Our surveys measured subjects’ preferences with respect to the slope of the annuity 
payout stream. Recall that Survey 1 respondents made binary choices between payments of 
identical present value that decline 2% per year, stay flat, or increase 2% per year in real terms. 
Figure 8 shows that among respondents with single-peaked preferences over payout streams,
18 
19% preferred the declining real annuity (-2% per year), 32% preferred the flat real annuity, and 
50% preferred the rising real annuity (+2% per year).
19 In other words, our respondents 
overwhelmingly preferred flat or rising real retirement payment paths rather than falling real 
paths, holding the present value of the payments fixed.
20 
By comparison, Hurd and Rohwedder (2011) find that, holding household composition 
fixed, real consumption declines by about 2% per year during retirement. How can we reconcile 
our survey respondents’ reported preference for rising payments with the declining actual 
consumption streams of retired households? Several complementary explanations are plausible.  
                                                 
17 Using data on annuitization choices in Swiss defined-benefit plans, Bütler and Teppa (2007) find that most people 
choose 0% or 100% annuitization even when partial annuitization is an option. This could be due to workers being 
unaware of the partial annuitization option and/or communications materials focusing on all or nothing (rather than 
partial) annuitization options. 
18 By this, we mean excluding the 11% who both chose real payments that decline 2% per year over flat real 
payments and real payments that increase 2% per year over flat real payments. 
19 When we regress a dummy for choosing a declining real annuity on Survey 1 participants’ ratings of the 
importance of various factors in their lump sum versus annuitization choice, we find that a one standard deviation 
increase in worry about the company not being able to pay in the future is associated with a 3.4% higher likelihood 
of choosing the declining annuity, a one standard deviation increase in worry about inflation is associated with a 
5.6% lower likelihood of choosing the declining annuity, and a one standard deviation increase in concern that the 
lifetime payments would not provide for one’s spouse is associated with a 3.1% lower likelihood of choosing the 
declining annuity. The other measured motives have no significant correlation with choosing the declining annuity. 
20 However, the percent of balances annuitized rather than cashed out is not very responsive to the annuity’s payout 
slope, averaging 61.4%, 60.4%, and 62.5% for the decreasing, flat, and increasing annuities, respectively. Only the 
difference between the flat and increasing annuities is significant at the 5% level.  19 
 
First, annuities enable agents to shift resources from death states to survival states. This 
has the effect of lowering the implied rate of return in death states (when the value of the annuity 
is lost) and raising the implied rate of return in survival states (since the annuitant receives the 
normal market rate of return plus an implicit survivorship bonus, a transfer from the decedents in 
the annuity pool). Because of this state-dependent rate of return, an agent with access to an 
annuity should choose a higher rate of consumption growth relative to an agent without access to 
an annuity. The Appendix contains a formal (Euler equation) derivation of this familiar result. If 
individuals in the real world do not have access to fairly priced annuities while those in the 
survey do, this could potentially reconcile the different patterns.  
Second, households may have biased expectations. For example, households may 
underestimate the frequency of transitory spending needs, such as home repairs, out-of-pocket 
healthcare expenses, etc. This will cause them to spend more than the annuity value of their 
wealth, resulting in a realized consumption path that declines over time due to the budget 
constraint despite their preference for a rising path. Households may be overly optimistic about 
their asset returns, which would also cause their realized consumption path to decline faster than 
they expected. Households may not anticipate the extent to which consumption and health status 
are complements (Finkelstein, Luttmer, and Notowidigdo, 2012), causing them to believe they 
will want to spend more in advanced old age than they actually do.  
Third, Survey 1 respondents may believe their life expectancy to be longer than the life 
expectancy that equates the present value of the various payment streams. Such a belief would 
lead them to expect to collect a greater present value of payments from the rising annuity than 
from the other two annuities. The greater perceived present value of the rising annuity could then 
cause respondents to choose it despite otherwise preferring a downward-sloping consumption 
path. 
Fourth, households may have money illusion and set their early retirement spending at a 
level that allows them to sustain a flat nominal spending trajectory, not fully appreciating that a 
flat nominal path is a real path that falls at the rate of inflation. We leave a fuller discussion of 
money illusion in the annuity market to future work. 
In practice, annuity and pension payouts change over time through cost of living 
adjustments (COLAs). Note that a typical COLA has two features: it changes the expected slope 
of payouts, and it provides a hedge against surprise inflation. While in principle these two 20 
 
features could be separated, they are in fact almost always bundled together. The prevalence of 
inflation-adjusted payouts differs dramatically across institutions. Contractual COLAs of some 
sort are almost universal in state and local government DB pension plans (Novy-Marx and Rauh, 
2011). In private DB plans, contractual COLAs are relatively rare; these plans tend to instead 
have either ad-hoc adjustments (occasional and less than the inflation rate) or no adjustments 
(Allen, Clark, and Sumner, 1984, 1986a, 1986b). The vast majority of single-premium 
immediate annuities (SPIAs) purchased are not indexed to inflation.  
In Survey 2, we asked respondents whether they wanted to add a COLA to their annuity. 
Doing so led to an initial monthly payment that was 32% lower than the no-COLA monthly 
payment. When this question was asked in the Minimal Inflation Information condition, 44% of 
participants chose the COLA. Adding a short description of inflation and explaining how much 
2% annual inflation erodes purchasing power over two decades in the Inflation Compounding 
treatment raised the demand for a COLA from 44% to 67% (see Figure 9), a 23 percentage point 
increase that is significant at the 1% level.
21 This result suggests that an insufficient awareness of 
inflation’s effects might depress the demand for COLAs in pension and annuity settings, and that 
enhancing the information about inflation’s impact that is provided to retirees could substantially 
raise COLA take-up rates.  
 
E. Framing  
How do alternative frames influence annuitization choices? Figure 10 shows the 
distribution of annuitization choices made by respondents in the main framing treatments of 
Survey 2. We examine the impact of these framing treatments on two outcomes: whether 
respondents chose to annuitize any balances before seeing the mortality graph, and the fraction 
of balances annuitized. The key explanatory variables in the regressions are six framing 
                                                 
21 We also administered the Inflation Compounding With Graph treatment, which included a graph showing nominal 
annuity payments by age. We find that 62% of participants chose the COLA, a fraction that is significantly higher 
(at the 1% level) than the COLA take-up rate in the Minimal Inflation Information condition but significantly lower 
(at the 1% level) than the COLA take-up rate in the Inflation Compounding treatment (without a graph). It is 
possible that the nominal payments graph was a visual distraction that made participants less attentive to the text 
explaining inflation, but there are several alternative potential interpretations.  21 
 
treatment dummies (the Minimal Framing treatment is the excluded category); the regressions 
also include a set of demographic controls.
22  
The first column of Table 5 reports the results from a linear probability regression where 
the dependent variable is a dummy for the respondent annuitizing a positive amount. The only 
framing treatment effect that is significant at conventional levels is that of the Flexibility and 
Control treatment, which told participants, “Choosing a bigger lump sum gives you more control 
over your investments and more flexibility over the timing of your spending.” This treatment 
decreased the probability of annuitizing any balances by 7.8 percentage points relative to the 
Minimal Framing baseline (significant at the 1% level). The Investment Framing treatment—
which told participants that the annuity’s return would be high if they died old and low if they 
died young, whereas the lump sum would give them the same return regardless of longevity—
reduced the probability of any annuitization by 4.8 percentage points, an effect that is marginally 
significant at the 10% level.   
The second column of Table 5 reports results from a regression whose dependent variable 
is the fraction of balances annuitized. Both the Flexibility and Control and Investment Framing 
treatments decreased the level of annuitization relative to the Minimal Framing baseline at the 
1% significance level; those in the Flexibility and Control treatment have an 8.7 percentage point 
lower level of annuitization, while those in the Investment Framing treatment have a 6.0 
percentage point lower level of annuitization. 
Brown et al. (2008) find that an investment frame discourages annuitization relative to a 
consumption frame, but Brown, Kapteyn, and Mitchell (2012) do not find an investment framing 
effect in the context of Social Security claiming age. Our results fall in the middle, finding a 
negative effect of investment framing that is significant but smaller in magnitude than the results 
of Brown et al. (2008).  
The remaining four framing treatments shown in Table 5 have coefficients that are 
generally of the anticipated positive sign (all of them in the first regression and all but one in the 
second regression), but these coefficients are closer to zero and not statistically significant. These 
null effects cast some doubt on the hypotheses that motivated these treatments: that annuity 
demand is suppressed by the fear of foregoing a better deal elsewhere, by the large contrast 
                                                 
22 The All or Nothing treatment recipients are excluded from the regression sample. 22 
 
between the magnitude of the lump sum and the magnitude of the monthly annuity payment, by 
the failure to recognize the longevity insurance embedded in an annuity, or by the failure to 
recognize the attractive state-contingent payment properties of an annuity. 
As a final framing experiment, we asked Survey 2 participants to make their annuitization 
choice again after seeing a graph of the probabilities of surviving to different ages, conditional 
on living to age 65. Figure 11 shows the average annuitization rates for participants before and 
after seeing this mortality chart. The average annuitization rate in every experimental condition 
is lower after seeing the mortality graph; the percent of balances annuitized across all conditions 
drops from 55.4% to 52.2%, a difference that is significant at the 1% level. The systematic drop 
could indicate that our respondents were on average over-optimistic about their expected relative 
longevity, and the mortality chart mitigated some of this bias, reducing annuity demand.
23  
 
F. Annuities with “bonuses”  
Survey participants cited the desire for “flexibility in the timing of my spending” as one 
of the most important factors in their annuitization decision. Our ex ante expectation that this 
consideration would be important motivated exploring the demand for an annuity that offered a 
higher “bonus” payment in one month of each year, funded by lower payments in the remaining 
months. We find that 60% of Survey 1 respondents preferred a Match-Inflation Income with 
Bonuses annuity over a Match-Inflation Income annuity without a bonus. Among those choosing 
the bonus, 58% wanted the bonus to be paid during the winter holiday season—November, 
December, and January (see Figure 12). However, our explanation of the bonus used “the 
December holiday season” as an example of when a bonus might be received, so some of the 
concentration in these months could be due to the explanation itself. Another caveat to keep in 
mind is that we did not measure the willingness to pay for this bonus feature, so we do not know 
the strength of the preference for bonuses.  
The Match-Inflation Income with Travel Bonuses annuity proved to be less popular, 
although it still appealed to a significant fraction of the population. Forty-five percent of 
                                                 
23 There is a vast empirical literature on how subjective survival expectations relate to objective survival 
expectations. See, for example, Hamermesh (1985), Hurd and McGarry (1995), Hurd, McFadden, and Merrill 
(2001), Smith, Taylor, and Sloan (2001), Smith et al. (2001), Hurd and McGarry (2002), Gan, Hurd, and McFadden 
(2005), and Ludwig and Zimper (2012). 23 
 
respondents preferred the Match-Inflation Income with Travel Bonuses annuity over the Match-
Inflation annuity without bonuses. The lesser appeal of the travel bonuses may be due to the fact 
that they are paid in June; the fact that their size declines with each decade of life, creating an 
overall declining real path for yearly annuity payments; and/or the fact that they make salient 
respondents’ physical decline in old age. Our previously discussed results showed that people 
usually prefer their bonuses to be paid in November, December, or January and that people 
dislike downward-sloping real payment paths. 
 
V. Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyzed two large surveys of hypothetical annuitization choices to 
learn what motives are important in annuitization choices and whether annuity product design 
and framing of the annuity choice can significantly affect annuity demand. Although 
hypothetical choices must be interpreted with caution, since they may not closely correspond to 
the choices people would actually make, they allow us to measure preferences for products not 
currently available in the market and examine choices in economic environments that differ from 
the current one. Surveys like ours provide a starting point for designing field experiments that 
involve actual consequential choices. 
Our results have several implications for annuity product design and choice architecture. 
To increase annuity demand, annuity providers could design products that give beneficiaries 
more flexibility and control. Our bonus annuity is an example of personalization that increases 
flexibility and control without compromising longevity insurance. Another example is an annuity 
with multiple annual bonuses. Such bonuses could either be pre-selected at the time the annuity 
was purchased or selected at the beginning of each calendar year. In fact, the payout stream for a 
given year could be made completely flexible without creating a substantial adverse selection 
problem. Problematic adverse selection would only arise if inter-year reallocations were allowed, 
so that a beneficiary could drain his entire annuity following a significant adverse health event.  
Other forms of personalization and flexibility could also be adopted, such as limited 
penalty-free early withdrawals and even asset allocation flexibility (adopting some features of 
the variable annuity market). Of course, there is a tradeoff between greater flexibility/control and 
greater complexity. Too much flexibility may drive some consumers away from annuities (cf. 24 
 
Iyengar and Kamenica, 2010). Finding the optimal mix of flexibility and simplification is a 
significant challenge.  
We also find that most consumers prefer partial annuitization of their retirement nest egg 
over either 0% or 100% annuitization. We find that the availability of partial annuitization raises 
the average fraction of wealth that ends up annuitized. 
Framing changes may also increase the appeal of annuities, especially frames that make 
the option of partial annuitization salient. In addition, frames that downplay investment attributes 
of annuities may increase annuitization rates. Regarding choices about COLAs, discussing the 
implications of inflation for purchasing power over long horizons increases demand for rising 
nominal payment paths.  
Finally, participants report that fears of counterparty risk play a large role in their 
annuitization choices. By adopting regulations that reduce this fear, policy makers may create 
moral hazard problems from consumers disregarding the financial stability of annuity providers, 
but they may also increase overall demand for annuities. 25 
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Appendix 1: Optimal Consumption Path With and Without Annuitization Contracts 
 
  In this appendix, we study the rise in the slope of the optimal consumption path when an 
actuarially fair annuity is introduced.  
  We consider a two period problem of an agent with constant relative risk aversion 
! ∈ (0,∞), pure (conditional on survival) discount factor δ = exp(-ρ), and survival rate s = exp(-
µ). Thus, the discount rate is ρ and the mortality rate is µ. For simplicity, we assume that all 
variables are real. The objective of the agent is given by 
 
     u(c1)+sδu(c2)+(1−s)×0 = u(c1)+sδu(c2). 
Note that there are two sources of discounting in this model: pure time discounting and mortality 
discounting.  
 
If the gross interest rate is R = exp(r) and the agent does not have access to an annuity 














Taking logs yields,  
( ) 21
1
ln( ) ln( ) ccr ρ µ
γ
− = −− . 
In other words, the growth rate of the optimal consumption path is  ( )
1
. r ρ µ
γ
−−  
  Now assume that the agent does have access to a fair annuity contract. To buy R dollars 
of consumption in the survival state costs s dollars in period 1. In other words, the price of the 
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−   
  Hence, the introduction of the annuity raises the growth rate of the optimal consumption 
path by  /. µ γ  Intuitively, this effect arises because the annuity raises the effective rate of return 
for claims on consumption in the survival state from R to R/s (a substitution effect). 
 
    
 
Appendix 2: A model of annuity demand.  
Consider an annuity that is defined by a set of attributes, indexed by k = 1, …, K.  
Assume that annuity demand by consumer i depends on (i) the price of the annuity, P, (ii) the 
marginal value of each attribute to consumer i, αi
k, and (iii) the intensity of that attribute in the 
annuity product,
k A .
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QA P αγ = − ∑                                               (1) 
The price of the annuity, P, and the vector of attributes, {A
k}k=1,…,K, are the choice 
variables of the firm. Suppose the cost to the firm of including attribute k with intensity A










.  (1) 
Now consider a monopolist firm that is designing a wide range of products that appeal to 
each type of consumer.  The firm chooses P and {A
k}k=1,…,K  to maximize: 
 






















⎠ ⎟   (2) 
 
Differentiating (3) with respect to P and {A
k}k=1,…,K  yields a set of first order conditions.  










=   (3) 
Equation (4) tells us that the firm should choose a higher value of A
k  for attributes that have high 
marginal value to consumers—i.e., attributes that have a high αi
k—and lower values of A
k  for 
attributes that are more expensive to create—i.e., those with high θ
k.   
Finally, we need to map this analysis back to our survey.  There are two polar cases that we 
study for illustrative purposes: (i) respondents have little cross-sectional variation in the 
perceived magnitudes of A
k, substantial cross-sectional variation in the taste parameter αi
k, and 
their survey responses are proxies for αi
k, and (ii) respondents have substantial cross-sectional 
variation in the perceived magnitudes of A
k, little cross-sectional variation in the taste parameter 
αi
k, and their survey responses are proxies for their perceived value of A
k.  Under case (i), 
product design should focus on the attributes with the highest average values reported in Figure 
6. Under case (ii), product design should focus on the attributes with the highest regression 
coefficients reported in Table 4.   
 
                                                 
24 There could be variation across people in the perceived intensity of the attribute, in which case we would need to 
index A
k by i. This case is considered at the end of the appendix. Table 1. Survey clarity assessment by survey participants 
Assessment of clarity  Survey 1  Survey 2 
Clear  53.0%  64.3% 
Mostly clear  33.8%  28.2% 
Sometimes clear  4.7%  3.2% 
Sometimes confusing  7.8%  3.2% 
Mostly confusing  0.1%  0.4% 
Completely confusing  0.3%  0.2% 
Decline to answer  0.3%  0.4% 
Total  100%  100% 





Table 2. Participant characteristics 
  Survey 1  Survey 2 
Age (mean)  59.5  59.6 
Male  50.2%  49.6% 
Married  55.4%  54.5% 
Number of children (mean)  2.1  2.0 
Retired  35.6%  40.3% 
Have a DB pension  39.3%  37.6% 
Own home  71.3%  69.5% 
Net worth (among respondents)     
   Median  $162,500  $150,000 
   Mean  $298,217  $286,594 
Highest education attained     
   No high school diploma  1.9%  1.7% 
   High school diploma  22.9%  23.8% 
   Some college  35.0%  35.8% 
   College degree  27.1%  26.6% 
   Graduate degree  12.8%  11.8% 
   Decline to answer  0.3%  0.3% 
Life expectancy     
   Longer than the average person my age  36.4%  33.9% 
   About the same as the average person my age  54.1%  54.3% 
   Shorter than the average person my age  9.5%  11.8% 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 Table 3. Demographic correlates of percent of balances annuitized 













Age (years)  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.000  0.001 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Male  -0.031  -0.018  -0.045  -0.020  -0.007 
  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
College  0.003  0.033  0.009  0.007  0.012 
Degree  (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Married  0.027  0.011  0.039  0.039
**  0.023 
  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Retired  0.039  0.043  0.020  0.023  0.030
* 
  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.031)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
# children  0.005  0.005  -0.004  -0.005  -0.007
* 
  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Homeowner  -0.058
*  -0.042  -0.038  0.009  0.017 







  (0.127)  (0.130)  (0.131)  (0.061)  (0.060) 
N  974  974  974  4,052  4,052 
R
2  0.009  0.008  0.008  0.005  0.005 
Source: Authors’ calculations. Each column reports the coefficient estimates from a regression of the 
percent of balances annuitized on the demographic variables listed in the rows. The dependent variable 
takes values between 0 and 1. Standard errors are in parentheses.  * Significant at the 5% level. ** 
Significant at the 1% level.  
   Table 4. Association between annuitization percentage before seeing mortality 
graph and factor importance ratings in Survey 2 
Income later in life  0.05
** 
  (0.01) 
Flexibility in spending timing  -0.04
** 
  (0.01) 
Company might not pay me  -0.06
** 
  (0.01) 
Spending need sometime during retirement  -0.00 
  (0.01) 
Worried about inflation  0.01
* 
  (0.01) 
Want to invest money on my own  -0.11
** 
  (0.01) 
Prevent overspending  0.06
** 
  (0.01) 
Give money to children or others  -0.01
* 
  (0.01) 
Worried about dying early  -0.04
** 
  (0.01) 
Keep money from children or others  0.00 
  (0.01) 
Constant  0.55
** 
  (0.01) 
N  4,130 
R
2  0.262 
Source: Authors’ calculations. This table reports the coefficient estimates from a regression of the percent 
of balances annuitized on respondents’ factor importance ratings for their lump sum versus annuity choices. 
The dependent variable takes values between 0 and 1. Each factor importance rating is standardized to have 
mean zero and variance one. Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at the 5% level. ** 
Significant at the 1% level.  
 
   Table 5. Effect of framing on annuity choices  
before seeing mortality graph in Survey 2 
  Annuity outcome 
  Any balances 
annuitized (0/1) 
Percent of balances 
annuitized 
Framing treatments     
  Minimal framing treatment (omitted)  --  -- 
     
  Good Deal treatment dummy  0.020  -0.002 
  (0.025)  (0.022) 
  Total Payments treatment dummy  0.017  0.019 
  (0.025)  (0.022) 
  Investment Framing treatment dummy  -0.048  -0.060
** 
  (0.026)  (0.022) 
  Flexibility and Control treatment dummy  -0.078
**  -0.087
** 
  (0.026)  (0.022) 
  Longevity Insurance treatment dummy  0.004  0.017 
  (0.025)  (0.022) 
  Mortality Credits treatment dummy  0.010  0.014 
  (0.026)  (0.022) 
Other controls     
  Age  -0.002  0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
  Male dummy  -0.023  -0.019 
  (0.014)  (0.012) 
  Has college degree dummy  -0.000  0.003 
  (0.014)  (0.012) 
  Married dummy  0.002  0.041
** 
  (0.015)  (0.013) 
  Retired dummy  0.013  0.025 
  (0.017)  (0.014) 
  Number of children  -0.001  -0.003 
  (0.004)  (0.003) 
  Homeowner dummy  0.010  0.010 




  (0.072)  (0.062) 
N  3,547  3,547 
R
2  0.009  0.017 
Source: Authors’ calculations. This table reports the coefficient estimates from regressions of annuitization 
outcomes on a set of framing treatment indicator variables and a set of demographic variables. The 
dependent variable in first column is an indicator variable (0/1) for whether any balances were annuitized. 
The dependent variable in the second column, the percent of balances annuitized, takes values of 0, 0.25, 
0.50, 0.75, or 1.0. The sample excludes participants in the “All or Nothing” treatment. Standard errors are 
in parentheses.  * Significant at the 5% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. 
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A.$$MatchNInﬂaPon$Income$Figure 4. Graph of nominal payments for  







Figure 5. Minimal Framing initial choice screen for unmarried subjects in Survey 2 
 






















































C.$$330,000$cash$out$immediately,$$0$per$year$aRerwards$for$life Figure 6. Average reported importance of motives for lump sum vs. annuity choices 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 









































Survey$1$ Survey$2$Figure 7. Distribution of percent of balance annuitized in Survey 2 before seeing 
mortality chart under the All or Nothing treatment and Minimal Framing baseline  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 
Figure 8. What slopes do people prefer for their annuity payouts in Survey 1?  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. This figure reports the percent of respondents in Survey 1 who most prefer 
the indicated intertemporal slope of annuity payouts. The sample is restricted to respondents with single-
peaked preferences over payout slopes.  
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Figure 9. COLA take-up rates in the Minimal Inflation Information baseline  




Source: Authors’ calculations. This figure reports the percent of respondents who chose to add a COLA to 
their annuity in the Minimal Inflation Information baseline and the Inflation Compounding treatment. 
 
 
Figure 10. Distribution of percent of balance annuitized before seeing mortality 






















































'Figure 11. Average percent of balances annuitized in Survey 2 
before and after seeing mortality chart 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 
Figure 12. Month chosen for bonus payment in Survey 1 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
57%$
50%$
57%$
60%$
52%$
49%$
59%$ 59%$
55%$
53%$
46%$
53%$
56%$
49%$
46%$
57%$ 57%$
52%$
0%$
10%$
20%$
30%$
40%$
50%$
60%$
70%$
M
i
n
i
m
a
l
$
f
r
a
m
i
n
g
$
A
l
l
$
o
r
$
N
o
t
h
i
n
g
$
G
o
o
d
$
D
e
a
l
$
T
o
t
a
l
$
P
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
$
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
$
F
r
a
m
i
n
g
$
F
l
e
x
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
$
a
n
d
$
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
$
L
o
n
g
e
v
i
t
y
$
I
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
$
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
$
C
r
e
d
i
t
s
$
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
$
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
'
'
a
n
n
u
i
t
i
z
e
d
'
Before$mortality$chart$ After$mortality$chart$
15.9%$
2.5%$
4.5%$ 4.0%$ 3.7%$
7.8%$
5.0%$ 4.3%$
5.7%$
4.7%$
16.9%$
25.0%$
0%$
5%$
10%$
15%$
20%$
25%$
30%$
J
a
n
$
F
e
b
$
M
a
r
$
A
p
r
$
M
a
y
$
J
u
n
$
J
u
l
$
A
u
g
$
S
e
p
$
O
c
t
$
N
o
v
$
D
e
c
$
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
'
'
o
f
'
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
e
n
t
s
'